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Chapter 5
Gangsta and Politics in Malaysia
Sophie Lemière
This chapter is a short exploration of the relationship between political 
parties and gangs through the case study of Pekida. The articulation 
of this relationship is the central concept of this study: we define it as 
‘connivance militancy’. In our scheme of thought, a gang that is involved 
in political actions, whether out of pragmatism or ideology, becomes a 
connivance militant group. It is because gangs do have an existence out 
of politics that they are seen as ‘opportunist’. Our main argument is that 
gangs are the mirrored expression of the ambiguities of society; thus 
they play a role in the system as shadow extensions of political parties 
in the public sphere. This chapter exposes the context that favoured 
the development of connivance militancy, the nature of Pekida and its 
satellite groups, and finally reveals the relationship between gangs and the 
ruling party (UMNO). So, if UMNO is on a honeymoon with gangsters, 
is this opportunist relationship ephemeral or the symptom of a systemic 
phenomenon?
Gangsta out of the Shadows
The ‘political tsunami’ of March 2008 was seen as the end of ethnic politics, 
eclipsing the violence of May 1969 (Ooi et al., 2008). The desertion of 
voters from the ranks of the ethnic-based parties of the ruling coalition to 
the benefit of a relatively more multicultural opposition has been seen as 
an attempt to overthrow the political majority of the Malays. After all, the 
opposition coalition is led by a man with low morals and by Chinese pigs 
(sic).1 
1 ‘Chinese Pig’ or ‘Cina Babi’ is one of the many racist insults used by some pro-Malay 
militants.
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In this context of virtual siege, pro- or ultra-Malay groups, as self-
proclaimed defenders of the Malays, started to voice out their concerns in 
the streets and in the media, and new groups, such as Perkasa,2 were created 
in 2009. Every newspaper and blog, whatever its political affiliation, and 
whether to criticise or to support them, has been giving gigantic coverage 
to these groups. Ironically, just a few organisations managed to attract 
enormous attention to their cause due to a thorough media strategy: how 
and why an ethno-nationalist movement has succeeded while supporting the 
vestiges of an out-dated pro-Malay and communal discourse. 
In December 2011 – that is 17 months before the 13th general elections 
– in Shah Alam, the predominantly Malay capital of the state of Selangor, 
Prime Minister Najib Razak attended the annual meeting of one of the 
most controversial (but registered) pro-Malay organisations, Pertubuhan 
Kebajikan dan Dakwah Islamiyah SeMalaysia (Association of Islamic 
Welfare and Dakwah of Malaysia (Pekida)). Najib’s promise of government 
aid in exchange for political support from the organisation’s members 
on that night has been seen by the alternative media as an endorsement 
of the controversial, and often seen as ‘racist’ or ‘extremist’, discourse of 
Pekida.3 The question is why the Prime Minister would risk endorsing such 
a controversial organisation in a pre-electoral context where non-Malay 
votes do count. Is there any link between the emergence of a ‘new’ ethno-
nationalist movement and the setback to UMNO’s hegemony? 
Rumours about Pekida accuse its members of being responsible for 
political violence and the harassment of opposition members. According 
to some, Pekida is the ‘UMNO thug’ (Magick River, 2010), a shadow 
paramilitary group or ‘the UMNO fifth column’ (Hakim Joe, 2012). Pekida 
is, in fact, a complex network of discrete NGOs that has been created by 
gangs in order to ally with political parties. Pekida is the name of one of the 
numerous NGOs created by a national gangsterised network composed of 
several autonomous gangs in order to offer political support, legalise parts 
of their activities, and ease the reception of funds. Pekida, being the most 
famous, has thus become a generic name that is being used to describe the 
network and each of its satellites (whatever their original name may be). 
Militancy is a business opportunity; gangsters have become militants to 
support the political parties with which they may share interests.
2 Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa lead by Ibrahim Ali, former member of parliament for 
Pasir Mas constituency, with the support of Mahathir Mohamad.
3 Please refer to alternative media: Malaysia Today (2012); Mariam (2011); Chi 
(2011); Masami (2011).
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This chapter presents some of the findings of my doctoral research:4 the 
fruit of 5 years’ fieldwork (2008–2013) in Malaysia and nearly 50 interviews 
with members of Pekida and satellite organisations, as well as politicians, 
journalists and other Malaysians.5 This chapter will explore the context that 
favoured the development of connivance militancy, the nature of Pekida 
and its satellite groups, and finally reveal the mechanisms of the relationship 
between the gangs and the ruling party. UMNO is on a honeymoon with 
gangsters: is this opportunist relationship ephemeral or the symptom of a 
systemic phenomenon?
Defining Connivance(s)
The ethno-nationalist movement – in its contemporary form – is an 
umbrella that has been created in answer to UMNO’s need for support. 
In that sense, UMNO’s ties to this movement are stronger than those of 
any other party because (1) UMNO has created the need, and (2) it has 
maintained a favourable context for the development of such a movement. 
In another political, sociological, historical and geographical contexts, 
the ideological umbrella could have been leftist, anarchist or feminist; 
and the main entertainer of these movements could have been any other 
political party in need of support – whether it is a ruling party or an 
opposition party. In that sense, these ‘new’ NGOs, and Pekida specifically, 
are connivance militants which discourse and actively serve the interests of 
the ruling party.
Connivance militancy is a secret political arrangement by which a 
formal political actor (i.e., a political party, a government or a politician) 
sub-contracts legal and/or illegal political actions serving its interests 
– ranging from advocacy to demonstrations and violence – to groups 
of individuals. Connivance militant groups (CMG) may be seen as 
entrepreneurs of mobilisation and/or violence who offer their services in 
exchange for money or advantages, and thus become informal political 
actors. In the Malaysian context, connivance militants represent the ‘muscle’ 
and ‘numbers’ a formal political actor may need when challenged by its 
opponents during every occasion of political life: elections, campaigns, 
demonstrations, controversies, etc. Three types of CMG are observed: 
4 Submitted in October 2013.
5 All the information described here was given by free will or found on the Internet. 
Every person interviewed in this context was fully aware of the research project and 
the identity of the author.
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(1) de facto militant groups (DMG) for which militancy is a raison d’être, 
(2) opportunist militant groups (OMG) for which militancy is a business 
opportunity, and (3) marginal militant groups (MMG), a category that 
covers marginalised groups (e.g., a banned group or a political advocacy 
group without a party) for which the coalition to a political party is a way 
to keep a foot in the political scene.
While all types of militancy were observed during the research, 
this work focuses mainly on the second type of militancy: ‘opportunist’.
This choice is justified by the fact that it covers an area that is not a new 
phenomenon in Malaysia but that was previously not exposed by scientific 
study. So, who are the ‘opportunists’?
Defining Gangs
The relationship between gangsters and politics has been widely studied 
in Indonesia during the New Order and after the fall of Suharto. Preman, 
formerly known as jago, describes a freelance entrepreneur in force who 
is operating for the State authority in a grey zone both inside and outside 
the law (Ryter, 1998; Wilson, 2010). As Ian Wilson explains, ‘by the 1990s 
preman was synonymous with street thugs, gangsters and an extensive 
networks of racket run by criminals but coordinated by the State’. The 
preman is a ‘figure of public revile, embodying the intersection between 
criminal violence and state power’ (Wilson, 2010: 12–13). Interestingly, there 
has not yet been any similar research conducted in Malaysia.
As Hagedorn (1998, 2008) noted: ‘The debate on the definition of gang 
is long and rancorous’, thus the definition of gang has been reshaped and 
updated according to the context and object of this study and implies the 
following characteristics. Here, ‘gang’ is defined as:
(1) A structured and hierarchical group federated under a leader to realise 
an ultimate pragmatic objective or (pseudo-) ideological cause, or both, 
which implies that members are involved in illegal activities and use 
various degrees of violence;
(2) The sustainability of the group is ensured by its flexibility and its 
potential for adaptation to political and social changes;
(3) The degree of institutionalisation (identity and structure) allows its 
longevity and credibility in the eyes of insiders, outsiders and the 
members of other gangs.
(4) An entity that transcends space and time. Gangs are neither the 
exclusive products of cities and urbanisation, nor a consequence of 
industrialisation; in that sense they may be grounded in rural or semi-
urban areas, and pre-industrialised or industrialised societies. 
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(5)  Authoritarian or transitional political contexts are favourable for the 
development of an opportunistic relationship between gangs and 
political parties. In this context, gangs may become entrepreneurs of 
politics or connivance militants to whom political actions are sub-
contracted.
Gangster’s Paradise: Ground for Connivance Militancy
For gangs, stepping into politics runs the risk of attracting attention to their 
illegal activities. Hence, their image changes into militant groups, and their 
illegal nature remains unseen. This work looks at the interaction between 
gangs and political parties through the prism of connivance militancy. By 
definition, the shadow identity of OMG remains unknown to the public, 
as well as connivance to political parties. The first step to identifying ‘the 
invisible’ is to understand the system of connivance that allows and favours 
its existence. 
Political, structural and socio-cultural factors have set the foundation 
for the development of connivance militancy in Malaysia, and the rise of 
CMG in the form of an ethno-nationalist movement in the aftermath of 
March 2008.
Abdullah’s UMNO’s Need for Support
The democratisation process that followed Mahathir’s resignation in 2003 
put Malaysia on the road to democracy. Despite its multipartism, Malaysia 
should not be defined as a democracy per se, but rather as an ‘authoritarian 
democracy’ (Heryanto and Mandal, 2004). So, this relative opening of the 
public sphere resulted in an increase in public demand for democratic 
reforms; among these were the suppression of repressive laws and the 
revision of the privileges given to Malays. The relative liberalisation of public 
expression reshaped the Malaysian public sphere, promoting the rise of new 
political actors (NGOs) and giving them an opportunity to play a more 
active and direct role in politics (Weiss, 2006). Over the past decade, NGOs 
from different religious and political persuasions started to mushroom all 
over the country, inviting all layers of society to rally to their cause.
The years of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s Prime Ministership (2003–09) 
witnessed the blossoming of ethno-nationalist NGOs which use a rhetoric 
based on religion and identity that was previously unknown or non-
existent. According to a Pekida group leader based in Subang Jaya, ‘The 
Abdullah years have been the golden age of Pekida; he is our godfather.’ 
In the early dates of his office, Abdullah – who became Prime Minister by 
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Mahathir’s designation, not by election – was in need of strong support. 
In order to maintain his party’s influence, Abdullah used the network of 
the organisation to which he was introduced as patron.6 Nevertheless, 
the opposition’s victory in five states in the March 2008 election seriously 
hit UMNO’s credibility for the first time since independence. Confronted 
by the emergence of alternative media on the internet (Weiss, 2012), the 
controversial ruling party’s electoral machinery was shown to be not strong 
enough to retain strategic states like Selangor. Thanks to the development of 
new media that resulted in the emergence of greater political awareness, a 
large number of urban and rural traditional Barisan Nasional’s (BN)7 voters 
cast their vote for the opposition, cutting across the traditional communal 
political cleavages. The results that led to the resignation of Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi less than a year later symbolise the death-knell of the UMNO’s 
electoral superiority to the profit of the opposition, Pakatan Rakyat. 
In February 2009 the defection of three Pakatan state assemblyman 
challenged the majority of the Perak State Assembly. This event resulted in 
several episodes of violence and demonstrations against Pakatan leaders 
who were in favour of dissolution of the State Assembly after the loss of their 
representatives. It was at this stage that Pekida members appeared, publicly 
waving flags bearing their organisation’s colours (yellow, red and green), 
and wearing yellow (the royal colour) headbands that read ‘Daulat Tuanku’.8 
Despite their violence, none of the Pekida’s militants involved were arrested. 
In April 2009 Abdullah stepped down from his office. In February 
2010 the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court decision declaring 
Barisan’s takeover of the Perak State Assembly as unlawful, and confirmed 
the appointment of Zambry Abdul Kadir as Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) 
of Perak. Since then, Zambry has been guest of honour at every martial 
arts assembly organised in Perak and Kuala Lumpur by the Pekida NGO 
network. Perak is indeed a stronghold for Pekida groups – and the place 
where I did most of my field research. Soon after the events, several leaders 
and members interviewed in Perak mentioned BN’s takeover with pride and 
explained that they and ‘their guys’ were involved in the violence, or ‘would 
have been ready to go anytime if UMNO’s politicians needed more muscles’. 
6 Date unknown. All Pekida members interviewed recognised Abdullah as the 
organisation’s patron.
7 Barisan Nasional (BN) is the ruling coalition lead by the United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO).
8 ‘Long live the Sultan’.
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The Myths of a Nation: Sociohistorical Factors
Malays are the dominant group in Malaysia. As in every group of people, 
their sense of belonging to the same community lies in their belief they 
are sharing a common ancestry, a common history or myths. Most Malays 
perceive (or are made to believe) that they are the original inhabitants of 
Malaysia – the myth of the indigenous – thus this is used to justify the fact 
that they have a special position which entitles them to special privileges and 
rights – the myth of sovereignty – and must defend these rights against the 
others – the myth of resistance. The three myths are intertwined and made 
more complex by the religious element; the idea of the need for protection 
of Islam amplifies tremendously the myth of resistance. These myths, 
perpetuated by state institutions and political parties’ propaganda, have set 
the foundation for ethnic tensions and fears. 
Malay nationalism has been a key element in the discourse of Islamist 
reformist and secular traditionalist anti-colonial movements. Since its 
creation, in 1946, before independence, UMNO has embodied Malay 
nationalism and propagated the three myths described above. Today, the 
myth of the Malays as a homogeneous group of people is a historical fantasy 
that serves the contemporary ethno-nationalist rhetoric used by CMG. 
Ethno-nationalist groups are today the self-proclaimed defenders of the 
Malay myths and use this rhetoric to recruit supporters. Perkasa claims 
to defend Malay rights, while Pekida NGOs argue that they are the sole 
guardian of the Malay culture and its tradition.
The Shadows of May 1969
The 10 May 1969 election was the third general election after independence. 
The ruling coalition, the Alliance, was confident of retaining its two-thirds 
majority in the Federal Assembly. The result of the election in favour of the 
opposition parties was an abrupt revelation of the fragility of a superficial 
inter-ethnic consensus. The coalition managed to maintain a weak 
majority on a federal level, but lost the states of Perak and Selangor – two 
economically vital states with large Chinese constituencies – to opposition 
parties. This loss was interpreted as a switch of Chinese voters who could 
not remain faithful to the MCA and a risk for Malays to lose power to the 
Chinese. The reactions among the most extreme UMNO members were first, 
to challenge directly the credibility of the Alliance, and – in a more subtle 
way – to question the possibility of governing a multi-ethnic country within 
a democratic system (Goh, 1971: 17). To some, these poor results were the 
consequences of giving citizenship to the non-Malays after independence 
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which had indeed been a way for them to acquire political power that 
should remain in the hands of the Malay community. Goh (1971) describes 
a leaflet in which the author urged that ‘the extra-parliamentary government 
instituted upon the declaration of State of emergency be perpetuated and 
democracy forsaken’. This election gave UMNO supporters the impression 
that the country was on the verge of falling into the hands of ‘immigrants’ 
(ibid.).
The riots opposing Chinese and Malays started on 13 May and 
continued until 18 May. Malaysian history books present the event as a 
‘spontaneous outburst of racial violence in a multi-ethnic society’ (Kua, 
2013); the official figures indicate that 196 persons were killed, 180 wounded 
by firearms and 259 by other weapons; 9143 persons were arrested and 5561 
charged in court; 6000 persons were rendered homeless, 211 vehicles were 
destroyed (at least) and 753 buildings were damaged or destroyed by fire 
(ibid.: 9). 
Kua questions the role of the State apparatus (police and army) and 
the political party leaders and members – more specifically, the ruling 
party UMNO youth branch. The author reads the orchestration of ethnic 
violence by the ruling party as ‘a fascist trend which threatens to sabotage 
democracy in Malaysia’. According to Kua (ibid.), the event of May 1969 
was the bloodiest clash of the many other racial outbursts to come. He 
argues that all were orchestrated violence. He draws the conclusion that the 
responsibility for the violence that has occurred in Malaysia since 1969 goes 
to UMNO leaders who have been manipulating UMNO Youth members, 
together with the leniency of the army and the police (a conclusion drawn 
from their reluctance to interfere in the clashes). 
Kua (ibid.: 7) addresses the responsibilities of political parties and 
emphasises the role of UMNO and its youth branch. Unfortunately, the 
author does not push his analysis further to understand the reasons for such 
manipulation; to him the ethnic violence that occurred in Malaysia, 13 May 
being the most violent, is ‘the physical expression of a fascist ideology run by 
UMNO’, and used to instigate fear. The analysis needs to be pushed further. 
The reason for such political manipulation cannot be simplistically defined 
as the expression of an ideology, but should rather be seen as a way to secure 
political power. Secondly, the individuals or groups that were assimilated 
into UMNO Youth may fall under the typology of connivance militants 
operating under the legal banner of UMNO Youth.
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The Overlap of the Spheres of Power: Structural Factors 
Malaysian political theatre shall be depicted as a trio of intertwined spheres 
of actors, which play an active part in the design of contemporary politics. 
The political sphere (1) encompasses political parties, including the ruling 
party, the government and the state institutions. The economic sphere (2) is 
one of entrepreneurship, private and public companies; it is the ‘corporate 
world’. And finally the public sphere (3) is the one of non-governmental 
organisation (NGOs) and the media. The nature of interactions between the 
elements of this trio is at the core of the political dynamics in the country. 
The structure of the Malaysian political theatre sets the lines along which the 
game of politics is played, and the way individuals (or groups of individuals) 
act in, out or across the spheres. The porosity of the spheres is one of the 
specificities of this system where political actors or individuals are allowed to 
play one or more roles. For example, politicians sit on the boards of private 
and public-listed companies, and mainstream media companies (TV, radio 
and newspaper) are owned by leaders of component parties of the ruling 
coalition. ‘Business politics’ or patronage is, indeed, one of the pillars of the 
political system. 
The opaqueness of the Malaysian system (1) contributes to the 
perpetuation of the Malay myth refashioned into contemporary ethno-
nationalism (2) and the current political and economic situation that has 
challenged the ruling party’s hegemony (3) constitutes favourable ground for 
the development of connivance militancy. Pekida’s NGOs have blossomed in 
answer to UMNO’s need for support, offering great business opportunities. 
In developing connivance with UMNO, Pekida’s gangs have been able to 
enjoy the flexibility of the legal framework regulating the (often loose) 
registration of NGOs, and the general leniency of State institutions, when 
creating and running their ethno-nationalist umbrellas.
Pekida: Opportunist Militant Group!
(Re)-Constructing Pekida’s History
Pekida is a registered Muslim organisation. The first mention of the name 
‘Pekida’ was found in the Asian Almanac in 1978. The short article advertises 
the creation of a new religious organisation and explains its origins. The 
original organisation Tentera Sabillullah (Holy Army), a religious criminal 
organisation, was dissolved in 1978. The members re-formed as two separate 
organisations: Pertubuhan Angkatan Sabillullah (Association of Holy Forces 
(PAS)) and Pekida. A decade later, the government authorities accused 
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PAS of being a terrorist organisation linked to the Parti Islam SeMalaysia 
(Islamist Party (PAS)) and dissolved the organisation. According to Pekida’s 
internal history, that remains quite blurred for most members; the many 
activities of Pekida, in politics and in business, developed with the support 
of high-profile politicians and businessmen, out of sight of the authorities, 
the media and academia until recently. 
A Snake with a Thousand Heads
Pekida is often referred to as ‘Tiga Line’ (Three Lines) as a symbol of the 
colours of its official flag: red, yellow and green. The three colours of the 
organisation embody its allegiances: to the Malay community (red as blood), 
to the Sultan (yellow for Royals) and to Islam (green). Pekida is often said 
to be divided into two lines: the official line ‘White’, which represents the 
registered organisation – the NGO called Pekida – and the underground 
line ‘Red’ that represents the gangsterised network behind the NGO. A 
large number of the Reds are in fact also members of the White line. It is 
important to mention that not all the members of the White line are active 
in the Red line; one may be an NGO activist, but not a gangster. In other 
words, not all members of Pekida are involved in criminal activities but may 
enjoy the business opportunities offered by a highly connected network. 
Anyway, denial of the underground branches by the official leaders, and 
more recently UMNO politicians, is a rule (Jamilah Kamarudin, 2011; Teoh, 
2014).
Pekida’s nebula cannot be reduced to a set of colours: it is a well-
developed – and nurtured – system. Pekida’s gangsterised network is a 
polymorphic entity: a snake with a thousand heads that do not always 
talk to each other nor look in the same direction. Pekida’s gangs share the 
same roots, the hierarchy, the codes of honour, similar induction rites but 
bear differences in ethnic composition (exclusive or inclusive), nature of 
business (legal or illegal: drugs, clubs, rackets), level of political involvement 
and degree of violence. Leadership rivalries have sealed these differences 
and led to a political split. Since the death of PLB (his name must not be 
pronounced in public) in 2006, Pekida’s network has been in crisis. PLB did 
not name a successor and all the paduka (top leaders) still claim to be his 
natural heir. Since then, numerous offshoots of Pekida have been created by 
PLB’s first line of acolytes. Today, the most famous gang networks include 77 
(‘double 7’) and 36. Each network is composed of several sub-groups, which 
may answer to different names. Names and logos, if any, often represent 
numbers and animals – tiger, dragon, eagle, etc. – as inspired by the names 
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of the congxi gelap (Chinese secret societies). Gangs and their sub-groups 
are spread all around the country: there is no geographic logic – a member 
originally from Perak may belong to a gang that has its leadership in Kuala 
Lumpur. The name Pekida has thus become a generic term that embraces 
a very large national network. Estimations of membership are impossible 
because Pekida is a shadowy network; nevertheless, field research showed 
that members can be found all over West Malaysia, in every layer of society 
(rural to urban elite), and every institution (state, political, social and 
economic).
From Exclusive Ethnic Politics to Inclusive Pragmatic Business
According to the narrative of most Pekida members, the organisation was 
created following the May 1969 riots to protect the Malay community and 
Islam. The myth of the genesis of Pekida is largely cultivated by leaders to 
recruit youngsters, and used to justify political actions and/or mobilisation 
that may lead to violence. But when it comes to pure business (no politics), 
the ethno-nationalist rhetoric used by Pekida’s NGOs reaches its limits, to 
the benefit of a more pragmatic strategy. As a leader of a Subang area group 
would say: ‘We are not racist, I don’t care about ketuanan Melayu. Our 
motto is: make money and don’t get caught! But of course if needed I’ll do 
what it takes to protect my community (the Malays).’ Pekida NGOs’ ethnic 
exclusivity shatters when it comes to business. A network like 77 which is 
seen as one of the most powerful in the country, whose leaders are based in 
Kuala Lumpur’s outskirts, is multi-ethnic and multi-religious. And members 
are encouraged to mix in order to favour business. Most groups, even the 
most exclusive ones, are obliged to work with Chinese and Indian gangs 
outside and inside the network.
The sub-groups’ philosophy, political obedience and strategy are more or 
less flexible according to each leader and his personal ambitions. The level 
of political involvement, as well as the type of business operated, and the 
degree of cultural and religious mix may differ from one group to another.
Orang Di Dalam: The Insiders
Why did you join Pekida? is one of the first questions I asked each of my 
sources. The most common answers were: ‘I wanna be a gangster’, ‘I want 
to protect my race and/or religion’, ‘I want to make money and develop a 
network’, ‘I want to become a UMNO politician’. The membership is not 
a charge that you may inherit from your father, but some families may 
count more than one member. An individual becomes a ‘brother’ once he 
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has been through the induction rites. From an oath to a group fight, the 
induction ritual is a passage from the status of outsider to insider ‘brother’. 
Some rituals are tainted by mystical practices that are also found in silat 
and Sufi tradition. These practices are only cultivated and encouraged in 
some groups, but may take a very mystical dimension: invisibility charms, 
invulnerability, astrology, etc. 
The gang’s hierarchy and structure remain quite identical from one 
group to another. The evolution of a brother to the top of the pyramid 
depends on his capacity to mobilise people around him: the more members 
he recruits ‘under him’, the higher he goes. Business activities and political 
connections do count. Since the leadership crisis after the death of PLB, 
no national leader has been able to emerge. The Pekida gangs’ network has 
numerous top leaders, called paduka. The first circle of PLB’s acolytes was 
identified during the research, but most names are aliases. Most of the top 
leaders have a criminal record, mostly for murder and/or rackets.
Pekida’s membership is seen as a duty, and sometimes a burden. There 
is an obligation to answer the call of the leader once one has taken the oath. 
Members may be co-opted from every layer of society, at any age (above 
17). The organisation cultivates a strong sense of family and brotherhood 
among members. Each member is able to climb the pyramidal hierarchy (see 
Fig. 5.1) according to the number of recruits he has below him (he has thus 
created his own sub-groups) or according to its actions. According to Azmi,9 
a member from the KL area: ‘You join Pekida; you don’t leave or you die.’ 
Sleeping members do exist, more specifically when they are public figures. 
Some famous individuals are alleged or proved to be Pekida members; 
they do not take part in any of its political activities, but rather use the 
networks to multiply business opportunities and for private protection: sons 
of politicians in power, hip hop and pop singers, politicians, businessmen, 
civil servants or army officers. So, the social profile of members ranges from 
rural lower income to urban high elite and the network, while remaining 
mostly Malay, is after all relatively inclusive – Pekida may be one example 
of the cherished concept of Najib’s 1Malaysia. Women do take part in some 
of Pekida’s NGOs, but remain a minority and are rarely involved in political 
actions.
9 Not his real name.
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Gang Brand: Pekida’s Sub-Culture
Pekida’s brothers do cultivate a gang culture that is sometimes initiated 
and encouraged by their leaders. Being a gang member is a source of pride. 
Despite secrecy being required, members do show off their membership, 
and cultivate the image of being an insider (orang didalam). Some leaders 
have understood this tendency of the youngsters to bear the colours of 
their groups and have put a great deal of attention into designing aesthetic 
logos that will be put on T-shirts, keychains, stickers, hats, etc. and sold to 
members. 
Most Pekida gang members do believe that their political activities, 
or connection, put them in a grey area, and above the law. Thus they are 
not afraid of police authorities. ‘As long as you are not seen committing 
a crime there is no problem in showing where you are coming from.’ 
Recognition of brothers, ranks and sub-groups is essential for some, and 
this idea of belonging to the same family but different branches motivates the 
development of internal codes: clothes, car tuning, hairstyle, etc. The sense of 
belonging to an exclusive club is made even stronger by the use of the internal 
language called buah; it has 120 signs and is learned by most brothers. Some 
groups refuse to use it, but for most it is a way to communicate with brothers, 
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beyond the cultural, linguistic or ethnic differences.10 
Gangsters and Masters: The Rules of the Game
‘Do you fight? 
- Yes
Why?
- I want to defend my race and my religion.
When do you fight?
- I fight when I’m asked and paid.
By who? 
- I know UMNO politicians.
When was the last big fight? 
- We did it during Hindraf rallies. To kick Indians’ butt. 
Do you have weapons, or do you fight with your own hands?
- Oh, Indians are crazy! We have parang, and I have a gun too but in 
Malaysia it is very hard to keep. We fight with fist too.
But, Azmi, I know your grandfather was Indian. So how does that make you 
feel?
- I don’t care, I’m a Malay first!’
(Interview with Azmi, 21, sub-group leader in Cheras, January 2009)
The strength of Pekida resides in the secrecy. Pekida’s potential 
for mobilisation and violence is intangible, and should as seen as 
potential ‘muscle’ for political parties in exchange for freedom for illegal 
entrepreneurship. In exchange for this support the organisation may exercise 
its business activities without any legal consequences. Thus, NGOs are only 
used to offer political support and gather militants. Gangs and sub-groups 
have developed their relationship to the ruling party and created martial 
arts, religious or Malay culture NGOs among which are Pekida (the most 
famous), BATAS, Amal etc. Interestingly, some members of these NGOs may 
not be part of the gang but co-opted directly from the NGO attracted by its 
‘code’, its visibility or its official rhetoric. Some boys join these organisations 
to be part of a network they know as sitting on the edge of legality but might 
never get involved in criminal activities and mostly remain active militants 
within the NGOs. Nevertheless, the gangsterised nature of the network 
behind the NGO is clear to most, if not all, members. One of the bases for 
recruitment is martial art (silat) groups. Numerous silat organisations are 
10 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=59EJN7XvdIk.
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indeed Pekida’s NGO network and it is very natural that their members 
eventually turn to political militancy. 
Today, ethno-nationalist organisations are among the most vocal in 
the public sphere, pushing the entire political continuum to the far right. 
The rise of Pekida reveals the shortcomings of the Malaysian system of 
governance and the ambiguities in its legal system, while emphasising 
divisiveness in the concept of a coherent Malaysian nation and identity. 
It seems that the government majority has been hijacked by a ‘right-wing 
lobby’ and is struggling to restore credibility and trust within the non-Malay 
constituencies; this hijacking may indeed be part of UMNO’s political 
strategy to maintain its influence to secure Malay votes and muscle if 
needed.
The rumours and legends built around Pekida are its biggest strength, 
playing on the fears of Malaysian society. Violent political actions allegedly 
committed by Pekida are serving the interests of the government in that 
they legitimate the sustainability of the ruling party’s authoritarian and 
discriminative laws. In fact the Minister of Interior pointed to contemporary 
violent political events that CMG are responsible for. The violent events 
are instrumentalised to revive the remembrance of the violence of May 
1969, and the potential of racial riots. According to this idea, a strong 
government and strong laws are needed to prevent violence, and protect 
‘racial harmony’, and UMNO is the sole protector of this harmony. In an 
interview, Mahathir Mohamad expressed his view on Pekida and Malay 
NGOS in general.11 To him Abdullah, in need of support, had no choice but 
to use these types of groups. According to him, they are the symptoms of 
a weak power. Nevertheless, the former Prime Minister explained that this 
support is important to the party and an old practice. In his own words, 
Mahathir explained:
Their formation [the Malay NGOS] is due to their lack of faith in the 
Malay party of the government to look after their interests (…) [Pekida] 
is a shadowy organisation, we’re not so sure about what they are doing. A 
government, you don’t know what they could do, they might undermine 
your support. So since you don’t know what they do, you support them. (…) 
It’s good to have them on your side. These are organisations whose strength 
and influence are not very clear, but it seems you should not be against 
them because you would lose votes. There is no reason why the government 
should not be with them.
11 Interview with the author in Putrajaya, 30 April 2012.
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Pekida is a nebulous and politically dual entity which could potentially 
serve the interests of any political party; although several members do 
acknowledge their allegiance to opposition parties, it has not been measured. 
As a consequence, and following the 2008 general elections, some gangs 
and sub-groups chose to turn their back on UMNO to give their support 
to the opposition parties. The leader (ayah) of a sub-group based in Perak 
explained ‘I used to be an UMNO member. I was locally in charge with 
running projects for the community, but I never saw the money. The money 
coming from the top will never come to me. UMNO is too corrupted. Now 
I’m a PAS member.’
Another Way of Looking at ‘Civil Society’
The political role of NGOs, despite their claim of being apolitical, is 
proven (e.g., Weiss, 2006; Lee, 2010). Usually the NGO scene is seen in a 
dual dimension: Muslim opposing non-Muslim NGOs or pro-opposition 
opposing pro-government. Interestingly, most NGOs are understood as 
occupying the political scene in opposition to the ruling party in general, 
and particularly to UMNO, since 1957. Apart from its own party branches, 
the mentioning of pro-government NGOs is rare in the analysis of 
Malaysian politics. There is another division within these pro-opposition 
organisations: between Islamists on one hand, and secular or non-religious 
organisations on the other hand. Thus when we look at connivance militancy 
(as in pro-government NGOs) it is a large area of the public sphere that has 
been totally ignored. 
The independence of NGOs in the public sphere should be questioned; 
we argue that a large number of NGOs are embodying the interests of 
political parties in different aspects, such as diffusing or supporting the 
party’s ideas, supporting and/or getting involved in its public actions, 
initiating political action such as demonstrations or violence serving the 
party’s interests. Clearly, the notion of independence usually associated with 
NGOs is a sham. 
The notion of ‘civil society’ is often used as a barometer to measure the 
degree of democratisation of a country. A country where a vibrant civil 
society has developed is often classified as ‘democratic’. Nevertheless, the 
true political independence of these NGOs is rarely challenged, nor is the 
legal frame under which they have emerged. 
Gangster-Mind or Master-Mind?
Pekida should be seen as a macro image reflecting today’s society: it is a 
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product of the disrupted structure of Malaysian society, and is rooted in the 
same myths. Pekida is indeed a product of the frustrations and anxiety of the 
Malaysian society as a whole. Pekida members have claimed responsibility 
for several outbursts of violence that were seen as ethnic or religious clashes. 
The connivance between gangs and political party that we call 
‘opportunist connivance militancy’ is not ephemeral, but one aspect of a 
system that has been in place since independence that questions the very 
nature of political militancy. 
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